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Abstract—Recent work has suggested reducing electricity gen-
eration cost by cutting the peak to average ratio (PAR) without
reducing the total amount of the loads. However, most of these
proposals rely on consumer’s willingness to act. In this paper, we
propose an approach to cut PAR explicitly from the supply side.
The resulting cut loads are then distributed among consumers by
the means of a multiunit auction which is done by an intelligent
agent on behalf of the consumer. This approach is also in line
with the future vision of the smart grid to have the demand
side matched with the supply side. Experiments suggest that our
approach reduces overall system cost and gives benefit to both
consumers and the energy provider.
I. INTRODUCTION
Currently, electricity markets are designed so that the elec-
tricity supply has to fulfill the demand. When the demand
increases rapidly, several problems occur, such as the possi-
bility of power failures and high generation costs as expensive
generators are turned on to fulfill demand for short peak
periods. One vision for the smart grid has been to reverse this,
and instead have demand match the available supply [10]. In
this paper we propose a method towards achieving this end.
The key to our method is the explicit cut of the peak
to average ratio (PAR) of the electricity load generated. We
introduce an approach which cuts PAR and then lets consumers
adapt by using an auction for redistributing the load. As others
have proposed previously, automated intelligent agents can be
used to represent consumers in these auctions, making the
entire process seamless from the consumers’ perspective [9],
[11], [13].
Both the challenges of obtaining low PAR and the advan-
tages have been widely investigated [1], [3], [12]. However, to
the best of our knowledge, no other work proposes to explicitly
cut PAR and let the demand side adapt to the supply. Many
other approaches which have investigated cutting PAR have
focussed on having the demand side voluntarily adjust their
consumption (given various incentives) in order to reduce peak
load [7], [8], [5].
Using auctions in electricity markets has been both proposed
in the literature and been used in practice, see for exam-
ple [2], [4]. In our work, however, we take a close look at the
relationship between produces and consumers and realize the
vision of matching demand with supply while also considering
demand satisfiability and minimum load guarantees, while also
supporting the possibility of additional benefits for each side.
The work most similar to that proposed here looked at the
use of service curves [6]. This work is similar in that it also
imposed certain restrictions on the consumers’ consumption.
However, in their work, the producers and consumers had to
agree in advance on the service curves contract, reducing the
ability to adapt to changing supply conditions.
This paper makes the following contributions:
• We propose an algorithm to explicitly cut PAR and prove
its soundness and completeness.
• We introduce a (multiunit) auction for distributing load
after the PAR cut. We provide a minimum load guarantee
for all consumers, and show that the auction support
truthful myopic bidding.
• Our simulations illustrate that our method benefits both
consumers and producers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We describe
our model and other basic notions in Section II. In Section III
we describe the algorithm for cutting PAR and prove that it
is both sound and complete, while in Section IV we present
our auction for distributing available load. Our experimental
results are presented in Section V, which conclusions and
further discussions in Section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Load Modeling
Load. Let N be a set of consumers and T = {t1, . . . , t|T |} be
a set of uniform time slots in a day. We denote the electricity
load (or simply load) needed by consumer i ∈ N in time slot
t ∈ T as Li(t). Hence, the total load of consumer i for a day
is given by:
Li =
∑
t∈T
Li(t).
In addition, we define total load per time slot over all con-
sumers as:
L(t) =
∑
i∈N
Li(t)
PAR. Peak to average ratio (PAR) is a commonly used
measurement to express how the peak compares to the average978-1-4673-5494-3/13/$31.00 c© 2013 IEEE
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load:
PAR(L) =
|T |∑
t∈T L(t)
max
t∈T
L(t) (1)
B. Multiunit Auction
Before introducing our auction (in Section IV), in this
section we briefly explain the basics of multiunit auctions.
Auction. We use a uniform price auction, where each winning
bidder pays the same price for each item/resource they win.
The price paid is the price of the highest non-winning bidder.
Given R resources and N as a set of agents or bidders, we
denote a bid of an agent i ∈ N as a 2-tuple (ri, vi) where
ri is the number of resources desired by agent i and vi is
her valuation (the price i willing to pay for each resource she
wins).
Winners. The resources are won by the k highest bidders. Let
W ⊆ N be the set of k agents who win the auction, then we
require that:
(i) the winners are the highest bidders: ∀i, j (vi ≥ vj)
where i ∈W and j ∈ N \W ,
(ii) we allocate, tentatively, the maximum number of re-
sources: if W ⊂ N then (∑i∈W ri) ≥ R, and
(iii) W is the smallest set of winners: ∀W ′ (∑i∈W ′ ri) < R
where W ′ ⊂ N .
Price. The price paid by each winner i ∈W is the valuation of
the highest non-winning bidder, i.e., p∗ = vj where ∀j′(vj ≥
v′j) where j, j
′ ∈ N \W . Note that when W = N then there
are two possibilities, either all bidders pay 0 or pay the reserve
price (a price which is fixed by the auctioneer as the minimum
price for a resource).
Resource distribution. We sort the winning bidders by their
valuation in ascending order. The resources are distributed to
the winners starting from the highest bidders. Hence, there
could be the case where the lowest winning bidder gets
resources less than what she desires. In this case, she has an
option to walk away (cancel her participation in the auction)
or accept the resources offered.
Example 1 (Multiunit Auction): A company would like to
sell 6 resources. Then,
• bidder 1 would like to buy 2 resources at $12,
• bidder 2 would like to buy 3 resources at $10,
• bidder 3 would like to buy 3 resources at $8, and
• bidder 4 would like to buy 1 resources at $6.
• bidder 5 would like to buy 2 resources at $5.
Hence the winners of the auction are bidder 1, 2, and 3.
Bidder 1, 2, and 3 got 2, 3, and 1 item respectively where
each of them have to pay $6 for an item. In this case, since
the total demand of bidder 3 is not met, she can decide whether
to take the 1 item offered and pay $6, or withdraw from the
auction (pay nothing and receive no item).
III. PAR-CUT
We cut PAR(L) by a cut percentage, c, resulting in a new
load vector L′:
(1− c) · PAR(L) = PAR(L′), (2)
and ∑
t∈T
L(t) =
∑
t∈T
L′(t). (3)
When condition in Eq. 3 is met, using Eq. 1 we can rewrite
Eq. 2 as:
(1− c) ·max
t∈T
L(t) = max
t∈T
L′(t). (4)
In Algorithm 1 we provide a technique to explicitly cut
the PAR of the original load generated by consumer demand.
The returned result is a load whose PAR has been cut. Cutting
PAR while maintaining overall amount of load (as described
in Section III) means that there are some amount of load
shifted from their original time slot. In this algorithm we aim
to minimize the shift distance by first attempting to shift to a
neighboring time slot.
There are several helper methods used in Algorithm 1:
• findPeak(L): returns the peak load of a load vector L.
• min(A,B): returns the smallest between two number A
and B.
• shift(x , L, t1, t2): moves x amount of load from Lt1 to
Lt2 .
Algorithm 1: PAR-Cut
Input: cut percentage 0 < c ≤ 1, load vector L
1 p′ ← (1− c) · findPeak(L)
2 let T = {t1, . . . , t|T |}
3 foreach ti ∈ T do
4 if L[ti] > p′ then
5 d← 1
6 x ← L[ti]− p′ /*excess load*/
7 while x > 0 do
8 if (i+ d > |T |) ∧ (i− d < 1) then
9 return fail
10 if (i+ d ≤ |T |) ∧ (L[ti+d] < p′) then
11 loadShifted ← min(x , p′ − L[ti+d])
12 shift(loadShifted , L, ti, ti+d)
13 x ← x − loadShifted
14 if (x > 0)∧ (i−d ≥ 1)∧ (L[ti−d] < p′) then
15 loadShifted ← min(x , p′ − L[ti−d])
16 shift(loadShifted , L[ti], L[ti−d])
17 x ← x − loadShifted
18 d← d+ 1
19 return L
Algorithm 1 receives input c as the cut percentage and L
as the original load whose PAR is to be cut. We use Eq. 4
to define the new target peak p′ (line 1). Then, for each time
slot ti, we verify whether the load at ti exceeds p′ (line 4).
If this is the case, then we try to shift it (line 5-18). We
first try to shift the load at ti to its neighboring time slot by
incrementing variable d for checking time slot ti+d (line 10)
and ti−d (line 14). However, when we have investigated all
time slots and there is still an amount of load to be shifted,
then we conclude that it is not possible to do the cut, and the
algorithm returns with failure (line 9).
Example 2 (PAR-cut): Let us assume that we have a set
of time slots T = {t1, t2, . . . , t24}, and load Lt19 = 5kWh ,
Lt18 = Lt20 = 2kWh and Lti = 1kWh , where 1 ≤ i ≤ 17,
and 21 ≤ i ≤ 24. In this case we have PAR = 4. Furthermore,
let us assume that we want to cut the PAR by 40% cut
percentage. Hence, our new peak p′ = 3 (see line 1). First,
Algorithm 1 detects that we have an excess load at time slot
t19, and the excess load x = 2kWh . Then, it proceeds with
distributing the load to the neighboring time slot, t20 and t18.
This makes Lt18 = Lt19 = Lt20 = 3kWh . At the end of this
step, the excess load x = 0, and the algorithm returns the
newly modified load vector.
For the proof of the soundness and the completeness of the
algorithm, we refer to the input load to the algorithm as L,
and the resulting load as L′.
Soundness: We need to show that if the algorithm returns
L′, then this is correct (having property shown in Eq. 3 and
4). Satisfying condition in Eq. 3 is straightforward since we
never decrease or add new load. The only modification we
apply is shifting the load from one time slot to another. Next,
we always make sure that the maximum load in a time slot
never exceeds p′ (see line 4). This makes the condition in
Eq. 4 hold.
Completeness: We need to show that if the algorithm
returns fail, then it is not possible to cut the load (as specified
by the cut percentage c). The only condition where the
algorithm returns fail is when it reaches line 9. This means
that we still have an excess load, and we have no slot left with
load less than p′. Hence, in order to satisfy the condition in
Eq. 3, we have to put this excess load in some time slot. But
this will make this time slot have load greater than p′ which
is not permitted by Eq. 4.
IV. MULTIUNIT AUCTION FOR LOAD DISTRIBUTION
In this section we explain how we run multiunit auction to
distribute the cut load (the resulting load from Algorithm 1).
The auction is run either in the beginning of the day or a
day before. It is held in several rounds until all loads are
distributed. We use N as the set of consumers and refer to
agent i as the bidding agent representing consumer i ∈ N .
A. Initial condition
Let L′ denote the cut load vector on which we are going
to run the auction, and let L denote the original load vector.
For a time slot t ∈ T , whenever L′(t) ≥ L(t), the demanded
loads are distributed to the consumers.
Let Lxi be the actual load vector for consumer i ∈ N (the
actual loads delivered to consumer i’s residence) obtained in
round x of the auction and let round 0 be the initial step before
the auction begins. Then, we have consumer i’s actual load:
L0i (t) = Li(t) for L
′(t) ≥ L(t) and time slot t ∈ T .
B. Minimal Load Guarantee
It could be the case that at time slot t there is a consumer
i ∈ N who does not get any load because all loads have been
won by other consumers. It means that at time t consumer i
does not have any electricity. This could happen when L′(t) <
L(t) for some t ∈ T . That is, when we face a short of supply
condition (because of the cut) where the load supply at time
t is less than the actual consumers’ demand.
In order to prevent this condition from happening, we set m
as the minimal amount of load guaranteed for each consumer
to have when we face a short of supply, i.e. for some time slot
t ∈ T , when L′(t) < L(t):
(i) supply guarantee: L′(t) ≥ m · |N |,
(ii) minimal load guarantee: L0i (t) = m for all i ∈ N .
C. Initial Pricing
To protect the energy company getting paid 0 when we run
the auction (this can happen when W = N ), we define the
reserve price per Wh for each time slot t ∈ T as
p(t) =
cost(L(t))
L(t)
.
We define cost(L(t)) = c1L(t)2 + c2L(t) + c3 (increasing
and convex), such that time slots having higher load is more
expensive [8].
D. The Auction: Matching Demand Against Supply
We use the multiunit auction as described in Section II-B
with some modifications:
1) An agent submits a set of bid {b1, . . . , b|T |} all at once,
where bi is a bid for the load on time slot ti ∈ T .
2) Since it could be the case that not all loads are distributed
to consumers on one round of the auction, we run
multiple rounds of the auction where the loads available
for the next round are the loads left from the current
round.
3) Bids (how much load an agent want and at what price)
are placed simultaneously but separately for each time
slot.
4) The winners are determined for each time slot.
5) The auction is terminated when there is no load left or
there is no bid submitted.
Initial condition. Let Lx(t) be the loads left (after it has been
distributed to the winners) after the xth round of the auction.
Thus, we denote the initial loads available before the auction
begins as L0(t) = L′(t) −∑i∈N L0i (t) for time slot t ∈ T ,
where round 0 is the initial step before the auction begins and
L′ is the cut load vector.
Bid. In each round x of the auction, agents place a bid
on Lx−1(t) using their own valuation to get some load they
desired for each time slot t ∈ T . However, if the load available
in Lx−1(t) is less than what an agent needs, then she will
place a bid on Lx−1(t′) where t′ is the closest time slot to
t such that Lx−1(t′) is greater than what she needs. This is
often called as myopic best response strategy, i.e. each agent
is interested to maximize her own utility given the current
condition. Note that it is possible that a sophisticated agent
might be able to manipulate the system by reasoning and
acting over several time steps and do a bit better. However,
this involves sophisticated reasoning and could well be too
complex for more simple bidders. And we will show that the
optimal myopic strategy has attractive properties.
Winners determination. The winners are determined sepa-
rately for each time slot, i.e. we have a set of winners W x(t)
for each time slot. Next, the resources available are updated
to Lx(t) by considering the load that has been distributed to
the winners.
Demand satisfiability. Let x∗ be the final round of the
auction. In addition, for a consumer i ∈ N let L′i(t) =∑x∗
x=0 L
x
i (t) be the sum of load she obtained through the
auction for each time slot t ∈ T . Then, we require for
consumer : (∑
t∈T
L′i(t)
)
=
(∑
t∈T
Li(t)
)
.
That is, the total load obtained by a consumer should be the
same as her total electricity demand.
Truthful bidding is a myopic best response. We prove that
the auction supports truthful bidding, i.e. there is no incentive
for agents to lie about their valuation.
Proof: Assume that there is still load that needs to be
acquired by agent i on round x. Then, there are two cases:
1) Lx−1(t) is equal or larger than what agent i needs. Then,
agent i will bid on it. Assume that vi(t) is the agent i
valuation for the load in time slot t. There are two cases:
a) Agent i does not win. If agent i bid an amount < vi(t),
it could not make her win. However, if she bid an
amount > vi(t), she could win. But then she has to
pay v′ (the bid of the highest non-winning bidder), and
it is also possible that v′ > vi(t). In this case, agent i
loss (because she has to pay higher than her valuation
of the electricity at that time).
b) Agent i win. Assume that the highest non-winning bid
is v′. This is also the price that the winners have to pay.
If agent i bid b′, and v′ ≤ b < vi(t), then she still has
to pay v′ (she does not gain any additional benefit).
However, if agent i bid < v′, then she lost. Hence,
she does not get the load she want. And if agent i bid
> vi(t), this also does not give any additional benefit
because she still has to pay v′.
2) Lx−1(t) is less than what agent i need. Then, agent i
choose the closest time slot to t, that is t′, such that
Lx−1(t′) is equal or larger that what agent i need. Then,
the same the argument as in the two cases above (1a and
1b), are applied here by replacing t with t′.
E. Consumer’s Load Shifting
Note that a bid for an amount of load at time slot t ∈ T
placed by consumer i does not necessarily comes from her
actual need, from Li(t). Consider a simple example when
consumer i actually still needs to obtain her load for time
slot t′ ∈ T in the current round x, but Lx(t′) = 0. Since there
is no more load available in time slot t′, then she has to place
a bid for a different time slot t′′ ∈ T . When she wins the bid,
load shifting for consumer i occurs, i.e. she shifts an amount
of electricity consumption from time t′ to t′′.
F. Consumer’s Utility
We define consumer’s utility after the auction by two terms:
(i) cost: we compute the cost paid by a consumer at the end
of an auction.
(ii) shift percentage: in order to measure a consumer’s incon-
venience, we calculate the percentage of load that she has
to shift. The shift percentage of consumer i is:∑
t∈T |L′i(t)− Li(t)|
2 ·∑t∈T Li(t) .
V. EXPERIMENTS
In the experiments, we show the effects of the auction
to consumer’s utilities for different type of consumers. In
addition, we investigate whether there is any additional benefit
for the consumer and/or the energy provider from running this
auction.
A. Experiment Setup
In our experiments, we use an hourly time slot, i.e.
T = {1, . . . , 24}, and total consumers, |N | = 10000. Then,
we provide appliance usage setting to simulate consumers’
electricity demand. For the cost, any increasing and convex
function can be used. In particular, we set cost(L(t)) =(
(L(t) + q1)/(q2
√|N |))2 in order to include the energy
company’s marginal benefit, q1, and to control the price’s
growth, q2 (we set q1 = 100 and q2 = 1000).
For consumer valuations (see Section II-B), we use α ·p(t),
where p(t) is the reserve price at time slot t ∈ T (see
Section IV-C). In order to set α among consumers, we use
two types of distributions
1) US distribution: for each consumer, her α is drawn from a
set {1.0, 1.3, 1.5, 1.6, 1.9} with distribution 0.4, 0.2, 0.2,
0.1, and 0.1 respectively. This distribution is inspired by
the US households wealth distribution in 2004 1.
2) Uniform distribution: for each consumer, her α is drawn
uniformly from set {1.0, 1.1, 1.2 . . . , 1.9}.
Each experiment is run 10 times and all results presented are
with 95% confidence interval. However, the intervals almost
cannot be seen because the deviations are very small.
1http://www.faculty.fairfield.edu/faculty/hodgson/courses/so11/stratification
/income&wealth.htm (accessed: 15 September 2012)
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Fig. 2. Consumers’ utility based on shift percentage measurement (defined
in Section IV-F) grouped by their valuation (US distribution).
B. System Cost
We present how the PAR cut affects the system cost. We
show the result up to 50% cut percentage, since in our setting,
it is not possible to cut the PAR with 60% or more. As
expected, the more we cut the PAR, the lower the overall
system cost is. Our experimental results in Figure 1 shows that
cutting the PAR up to 20% does not give significant advantage.
However, cutting the PAR with 50% cut percentage give
almost 20% overall cost reduction. It looks very promising,
but one have to be more careful and look on how consumer’s
utility changes with increasing cut percentage (as we will show
later in this section).
C. Consumers’ Utility
We measure consumers’ utility from two perspectives. First,
we look at how much they need to shift their consumption.
Second, we look at the total cost that they need to pay.
Shift percentage. The results from both distributions (US and
uniform) depicted in Figure 2 and 3 shows the same trends,
i.e. consumers with lower valuation are the ones who shift the
most. This is expected since most of their demands which
compete with higher valuation consumers are not satisfied
(because they lost in the auction). Hence they need to shift
their consumption (bid for another time slot). For consumers
with valuation more than 1.7 we see no difference in their
utility, and they do not shift at all. With this high valuation,
we expect that they always win the auction and so see no
difference in their supply.
Cost paid. Figure 2 and 3 both show the same trends that
the higher the consumer valuation, the higher the cost. This
phenomenon is both caused by the reserve price and the
auction itself. Most of the consumers firstly will bid to satisfy
their original consumption schedule, which happen most of the
time in the peak time slot. Although we have already cut the
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Fig. 3. Consumers’ utility based on shift percentage measurement (defined
in Section IV-F) grouped by their valuation (uniform distribution).
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Fig. 4. Consumers’ utility based on the total cost paid (defined in
Section IV-F) grouped by their valuation (US distribution).
peak, the price of this time slot is still the highest compared
to the other (this is the time slot with the highest load). In
addition, since most of the consumers bid on this time slot,
most likely the winners for this time slot will be the higher
valuation consumers, and the highest non-winning bid (which
will determine the price they have to pay) will also be high.
As expected, low valuation consumers pay lower costs. This
can also be seen as the tradeoff (from the previous results)
that they need to shift more than the consumers with high
valuation. The setting with 50% cut percentage offer lower
cost paid compared to the others, but it also caused the low
valuation consumers to shift more (see Figure 2 and 3).
D. Consumers’ Additional Benefit
Compared to the current system, consumers gain an addi-
tional benefit using the PAR cut and the auction. Consumers
can save up to almost 20% their electricity bill depending on
the cut percentage implemented (see Figure 6). This happens
without having to reduce the amount of their electricity
consumption. For consumers with low valuation this saving
can be seen as the tradeoff since they experience load shifting.
However, what is more interesting is that this saving also
applies to consumers with high valuations (in this case, higher
than 1.6) who experience no load shifting at all (see Figure 2).
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Fig. 5. Consumers’ utility based on the total cost paid (defined in
Section IV-F) grouped by their valuation (uniform distribution).
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E. Company’s Additional Benefit
In this experiment, we calculated the total cost paid by
consumers and compared it to the energy company’s cost
model (the one that has to be paid by the consumers, as
described in Section V-A). Figure 7 shows that the company
experiences additional revenue by running the auction up to
almost 10% depending on the PAR cut implemented. The
larger PAR cut we have, the more peak loads are shifted. This
will increase the price in the peak time slot because most
likely the winners are consumers with high valuations, and
the highest non-winning bid will most likely also be high.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we addressed the future vision of the smart
grid to match the demand with the supply. Instead of relaying
the PAR cut to the consumer, we cut PAR explicitly while
still maintaining the same load. Because the load available
for each time slot are not necessarily the same as demanded
by the consumers, we used a multiunit auction to distribute
the load. Our experiments showed that the overall system
cost is decreasing as we have larger PAR cut percentages.
We also showed that there is a tradeoff between the price
per kWh paid by a consumer with the load shift percentage
she experienced. In addition, the consumer with low valuation
normally has bigger shift percentage and lower price per kWh
than the consumer with high valuation. Another advantage
is shown for the consumers that their total electricity cost
is lower compare than their original electricity cost using
the current setting (saving up to almost 20%). While for
the low valuation consumers this can be understood as the
tradeoff for their load shifting, the saving also happens for
high valuation consumers who does not have any load shifting.
The energy company also reaped an additional benefit from
running the auction by acquiring up to almost 10% additional
revenue. This phenomenon made the proposed approach look
promising.
This work can be extended by considering a case when
a consumer considers non-myopic strategies and reasoning
over multiple steps at once. Our conjecture is that weak
consumers (low valuation) can benefit from bidding on non-
peak time slots for her needs in peak time slots. By bidding
on non-peak time slots early, a weak consumer has a better
chance to avoid competition with stronger consumers (who
also have to shift to those time slots because of even stronger
consumers). Furthermore, our approach can also be used for
load distribution when we have load fluctuation (for example,
because of the renewable energy sources). Because the essence
of our approach is to match the demand with the supply, we
can use it either when we have to cut the PAR, or when we
have energy surplus to distribute.
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